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Abstract 
Prior research on institutional investors’ role in corporate governance draws a 
distinction between engaged and disengaged pension funds. The aim of this study is to 
shed more light on how pension fund practitioners talk about engagement and 
disengagement. Using insights from thirty-five in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
and round-table discussions with pension fund trustees, executives, investment 
officers and financial intermediaries, we identify different types of vocabularies and 
temporal perspectives used to account for different stances towards engagement. We 
highlight a tension between a seemingly causal relationship between accounts and 
future behaviour and argue  that these ‘accounts’, ‘vocabularies’ and ‘uses of the past’ 
in themselves need to be treated as an object of study because they may represent not 
simply the individual motivations, but rather the expressions of extant norms in the 
broader social context of financial markets. An important policy implication is that 
perceived realities of investment are unlikely to cause a change in pension fund 
behaviour because participants seem to decouple their view of the world from their 
impact on the world.   
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Introduction  
There is a general academic and policy concern in the UK about the way the 
financial system is operating; specifically, that investor disengagement and their 
short-term goals are damaging the economic health of the country (Plender, 2011; The 
Kay Review, 2012).There is now a formal agreement among policy-makers that both 
more accountability within the investment chain and more effective investor 
engagement are needed to remedy the situation (Stewardship Code, 2010, The Kay 
Review, 2012). Pension funds in particular have been regarded for over a decade as 
best suited to act as long-term and engaged investors because they tend to have long-
term and predictable investment horizons, and therefore they can provide ‘patient 
capital’ (Haldane, 2010; Hawley and Williams, 2000; Myners, Report, 2001; Ryan 
and Schneider, 2002; Davis, et. al, 2006; Martin, et al, 2007; The Stewardship Code, 
2010; The Kay Review, 2012). Yet, the evidence of pension fund engagement is 
mixed.  
Our research aims to shed more light on what characterises the distinction 
between engaged and disengaged pension funds. More specifically, how pension fund 
practitioners talk about engagement and disengagement over time. We start with a 
review of the literature, which highlights the paradoxical nature of institutional 
ownership without a commitment and mixed evidence on pension fund engagement 
vis-à-vis portfolio companies. To help explain why such variations in behaviour may 
exist, we frame our study in the construct of vocabularies of motive, sense-making 
and organisational enactment (Mills, 1940; Weick, 1969), combining this with the 
notion of temporality (Bluedorn and Standfier, 2006; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012). 
This novel analytical lens informs our methodology and data analysis, which we 
outline in our research design. By using the examples of pension fund engagement 
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and disengagement, we reveal the existence of different accounts and vocabularies of 
motive within pension fund investment practices. These vocabularies of motive are 
durable and also accompanied with distinctly different temporal perspectives. We 
term these as ‘engaged’ and ‘disengaged’ vocabularies. Disengaged vocabulary 
included common internal and external accounts, which were referred to as significant 
constraints to engagement. In contrast, engaged vocabulary included a range of 
external and internal accounts described as enablers of engagement. We also found 
that pension fund practitioners who used a disengaged vocabulary had a more 
negative perception of the present in comparison to the past, which led them to 
describe future as more uncertain and short-term. Engaged vocabulary consisted of a 
narrative of positive gradual changes in the industry over time, which was associated 
to a longer-term and sustainable future. In so doing, we present rich and novel 
empirical examples of distinct vocabularies and propose that they represent an 
important linchpin for understanding how vocabularies shape institutional behaviour. 
We highlight the need to develop a more coherent and common understanding of how 
vocabularies and temporal perspectives work, particularly as our findings highlight a 
tension between a seeming relationship between vocabularies and accounts and future 
pension fund behaviour vis-à-vis investee corporations. We conclude by considering 
the significance of our findings with respect to academic and current policy debates, 
offering some implications for further research.  
Ownership without Commitment: Mixed Evidence of Pension Fund Engagement   
Since Berle and Means (1932) examined the implications of the separation of 
ownership and control, the monitoring and disciplining role of institutional investors 
has been considered to be an important governance mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In his seminal work, Hirschman (1970) identified the investor/company 
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relationship within the ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ framework, where investors either sell the 
shares (‘exit’) if they are dissatisfied, or express concerns to management though 
‘voice’ or engagement. However, the empirical evidence investigating this 
relationship is decidedly mixed (Bainbridge, 2003; Dalton, et. al., 2007; Tilba, 2011). 
Most recent academic reviews of the current state of shareholder activism literature 
suggest that the research on shareholder engagement (both financial and social) offers 
conflicting perspectives on this topic (Goranova and Ryan, 2014; McNulty and 
Nordberg, 2016).  
Paradoxically, Davis (2008) and Jackson (2008) observe that although 
institutional investors seem to be increasing in both size and the concentration of their 
stakes, this concentrated ownership is generally liquid and without commitment, 
focusing on generating short-term investment returns. This is reflected in the trend 
towards increased stock turnover and shorter average stock-holding periods 
(Tomorrow’s Owners, 2008; Ownership Commission, 2012). For example, in the UK 
institutional investors’ portfolio turnover reached 56% (Jackson, 2008), while the 
average duration of equity holding has fallen from five years in the 1960s to just over 
seven months in 2009 (Haldane, 2010).   
Pension funds, it is argued, are best suited to act as long-term and engaged 
investors because they tend to have long-term and predictable investment horizons 
(Hawley and Williams, 2000; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Davis, et. al, 2006; Martin, 
et al, 2007; The Stewardship Code, 2010; The Kay Review, 2012). Yet, there are only 
a few UK (mostly quantitative) studies that examine pension funds in relation to 
corporate governance. The evidence is also conflicting.  On the one hand, most 
prominent (US) studies on shareholder activism have centred around California Public 
Employees Retirement System’s (CalPERS) activism on target firm governance 
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structure, shareholder wealth and performance (Smith, 1996; Hebb, 2006; Barber, 
2007; Choi and Fisch, 2008). In the UK, Clark and Hebb (2004) have observed that 
pension funds use their influence to increase managerial accountability and corporate 
transparency in order to raise standards of corporate behaviour. A survey of more than 
250 pension funds in fifteen European countries by Sievänen, et al (2013) also 
demonstrates that large and small pension funds are active in responsible investment. 
However, this evidence is contrasted with studies that regard pension funds as 
inefficient monitors (Bushee, 1998; Duggal, 1999; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling 
1996; Romano, 2000, Tilba and McNulty, 2013). Bushee (1998) characterises pension 
funds as ‘quasi-indexers’, arguing that they exacerbate incentives for myopic 
investment behaviour because their fragmented and passive ownership precludes them 
from gathering important company information, disincentivizing the monitoring of 
managers. A number of scholars have consistently doubted pension fund ability and 
inclination to act as principals and influence investee companies (Faccio and Lasfer, 
2000; Webb, et. al. 2003; Hellman, 2005; Kahan and Rock, 2007; Conyon and Sadler, 
2010). Similarly, Goergen and Renneboog (2002) argued that institutional investors in 
the UK are mostly passive.  
Pensions industry reports also present contrasting evidence. For example, the 
latest report by ShareAction on the actual voting practices by asset managers (2015) 
reveals a tendency by some managers to vote in favour of company management’s 
recommendations even when there was a case to vote against them. The actual uptake 
of stewardship by institutional investors remains scant. This is contrasted with the 
NAPF Engagement Survey (2014), according to which 94% agreed that institutional 
investors (including pension funds) have stewardship responsibilities which include 
engaging with companies and voting shares.  
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This mixed evidence suggests a gap in our understanding about different 
qualitative influences that may be at play in informing institutional behaviour. For 
example, Hendry, et. al. (2004; 2006; 2007) were exploring different motivations 
behind investor engagement. Similarly, Tilba and McNulty (2013) highlight the need 
to attend to the practices, meanings and motives that underpin investment 
management by institutions. We argue that there is a need to shed new light on 
pension fund investment strategies using novel empirical and qualitative explanations 
of the distinction between engaged and disengaged pension funds. More specifically, 
we need to understand how pension fund practitioners talk about their investment 
practises and what accounts they give about engagement and disengagement. We 
draw on vocabularies of motive, sense-making and organisational enactment (Mills, 
1940; Weick, 1969) and use this perspective with particular attention to temporality as 
an analytical lens to explore our research question and interpret the data.  
Practical Reasoning, Vocabularies of Motive and Organizational Enactment   
Organizational scholars have long researched vocabularies to understand 
institutional practices and with the rise of research on language, meaning and 
discourse, these theoretical frameworks have been helping advance the work on 
institutional logic as novel extension for organizational research and practice. A large 
part of this work has been done by scholars who propose that vocabularies are 
instrumental in the social construction of meaning, organizing practices and 
institutions (Loewenstein, et. al, 2012).  
An interest in vocabularies is longstanding and has been most influenced by 
the work of Kenneth Burke and C. Wright Mills who provided an integrated and 
developed theory of vocabularies. In his seminal work on ‘Situated Actions and 
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Vocabularies of Motive’, Mills (1940) suggests that when an agent is articulating 
motives, he is not merely describing his experienced social action, but also 
influencing others and himself. Broadly, Mills suggests that the ways in which people 
talk about their motives is dependent on social contexts. In other words, the 
association with a subcultural group can have an impact on an individual’s decisions 
and behavior (Mills, 1940). Similarly, a prominent American organizational theorist 
Karl Weick uses the term enactment to denote the idea that certain phenomena, for 
example, organizations or certain behaviors and human actions, are created or enacted 
by being discussed. Weick theorizes that by constructing, objectifying and enacting 
their thoughts, people literally create their own reality and constraints (1969). 
Although talk is the fundamental material of human relation, the ‘sociology of talk’ 
(Scott and Lyman, 1968) remains underdeveloped in management and corporate 
governance research.  
According to Scott and Lyman (1968), the central feature of talk is giving and 
receiving of accounts or statements made to explain untoward behavior, bridging the 
gap between expectations and actions.  The explanations of the identification of 
intentions, purposes and choices of actions are revealed to us through the accounts 
that practitioners give of their daily practices. By an account Scott and Lyman (1968) 
mean ‘a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward 
behavior – whether that behavior is his own or that of others, and whether that 
proximate cause for the statement arises from the actor himself or form someone else’ 
(p. 46).  Accounts thus reflect ‘socially approved vocabularies which neutralize an 
act or its consequences when one or both are called into question’ (Scott and Lyman, 
1968: 46-51).  
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As actions contain some ‘mental element’, the accounts of actions (which can 
be excuses or justifications) will have components of ‘knowledge’ and ‘will’ (Scott 
and Lyman, 1968). Following from this logic, an individual might excuse himself 
from responsibility, using claims that certain information was unavailable to him, and 
if it had been, his behavior would have been different. Both knowledge and will can 
be impaired under certain conditions, with mitigated responsibility as a direct 
consequence. Such a pattern of behavior is also referred to as ‘culturally-established 
sense-making – or “interpretative repertoires”’ (Potter & Wetherell 1987; 149, 
Wetherell and Potter, 1988; 171). In social interaction an individual will learn a 
‘repertoire’ of situations or backgrounds, as well as corresponding appropriate 
accounts which are acceptable to others. In other words, vocabularies help establish a 
common ground, a shared knowledge among social actors both within and across 
organizations that is essential for coordinated social action (Bechky, 2003; Cramton, 
2001). Following this perspective, a key research objective would be to understand 
how social actors themselves handle internal and external explanations of action as 
part of their discursive practice (Wetherell, 2005). Furthermore, because meaning is 
grounded in experience it is important to discuss examples of specific practices, 
activities, events or relationships that are collectively experienced and conventionally 
referred to (Loewenstein, et. al, 2012). 
The research drawing on vocabularies is wide ranging from research on 
rhetoric (Sillince, 2005; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005); culture (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967; Mills, 1939) and institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In 
corporate governance Nordberg and McNulty (2013) observe a shifting discourse in 
the codification within UK away from board structures, composition and procedures 
in Cadbury towards ‘behaviour’, as the code seeks to improve board effectiveness as a 
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mechanism of governance. Aspara, et. al. (2014) theorized about self-reinforcing 
processes and biases within organizations when they investigated the causes for 
corporate short-termism. Most recently, Whittle and Mueller (2015) have used similar 
ideas when they examined the testimonies of leaders of British banks during a UK 
public inquiry into the financial crisis. They have identified competing interpretative 
repertoires of agency and structure that the UK bankers used to handle accountability, 
and particularly their roles in the events leading up to the collapse of the banks.  
All in all, scholars who use discourse analysis tend to focus on the delivery of 
ideas as a form of strategic action but only rarely do they explore actors’ vocabularies 
and the relations of words to examples (Loewenstein, et. al, 2012). In this paper, we 
aim to fill this gap by using the empirical examples of pension fund engagement and 
disengagement to examine the accounts (both historic and present) used by 
participants in their daily work practices, which form vocabularies in relation to these 
examples.  
On Temporality  
Time has played only a supporting role in prior organization and management 
studies. Understanding temporality or the ‘uses of the past’ by managers, 
organisations and industries represents an important and very interesting dimension of 
our study. Previous management research and theory tended to understand history as 
‘organisation’s history’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982) or histories of industries or 
populations of firms as ‘given’ (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). In contrast, the ‘uses of 
the past’ approach emphasizes the significance of interpretations of the past and their 
relationship to how organizational actors experience the present and set expectations 
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for the future. Thus, it represents a novel lens from which to understand a range of 
phenomena related to organization and management (Mads, et al, 2016). 
 Time is a basic dimension of organizations and differences in views and 
assumptions about time shaping organisational culture (Schein, 1983) and norms of 
organisational behaviour (Doob, 1971). Temporal dimensions of organizations 
include temporal orientation (i.e. past, present and future), trade-offs related to work 
pace and awareness of time use (Schriber and Gutek, 1987). A perception of time that 
considers time cycles adds temporal depth to organizational image (Schriber, 1985). 
Using the notion of ‘temporal imagination’, Bluedorn and Standfier (2006) argue that 
individuals and organizations interpret time and develop their own ‘timescapes’ 
(namely, practiced approaches to time), which in turn shapes their behaviour. 
Referring to Cervantes when he wrote ‘for all times are not the same’ (1615/1898: 
270) nearly 400 years ago, Bluedorn and Standfier (2006) ask an important question: 
if time is socially constructed and it differs, how much does it differ? How can 
variability of interpretation of time explain variances in human and organizational 
behaviour? More recently, Slawinski and Bansal (2012) began to address these 
questions and reveal a multi-faceted view of time when they observed two distinct 
corporate responses to climate change grounded in two different temporal 
perspectives. Their theorizations about time, as well as the notions of vocabularies of 
motive offer a novel cross-disciplinary lens to shed new light on pension fund 
investment strategies.  
Research Design and Methodology  
This paper has been written as part of a much larger qualitative study into UK 
pension funds’ investment practices and corporate engagement. This study was based 
on 35 interviews with pension fund trustees, executives, investment officers and 
11 
 
financial intermediaries, documentary analysis and observations of four pension fund 
investment meetings. For this paper, of particular significance were the meanings and 
actions that 35 key decision-makers assigned to their investment management 
practices.  
Sampling  
The UK pension fund industry is remarkably concentrated, with a relatively 
small proportion of big pension funds and a long ‘tail’ of small schemes. There are 
only four pension funds in the whole population with assets under management over 
£20 billion. We categorize pension funds with assets under management between £10 
and £20 billion as ‘large’; funds between £5 and £10 billion as ‘medium’; and funds 
with assets under management between £2 and £5 billion as ‘small’ funds within the 
UK Top 100 listing. We used theoretical sampling (Shah and Corley, 2006) to 
identify the funds to study and whom to interview. The literature on pension fund 
governance suggests that pension fund context, size of assets, maturity, internal 
investment management capabilities, liquidity requirements, as well as pension fund 
type (e.g., occupational or local authority fund), are all relevant when determining the 
approach to investment management, and ultimately the fund’s relationship with 
investee corporations. These pension fund characteristics served as initial sample 
criteria which informed the identification of the pension funds in two phases (detailed 
in Appendix A). Apart from these fund characteristics, we were also guided by the 
assumption that larger (and more internally resourced) pension funds would be better 
positioned to engage with portfolio companies (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Tilba and 
McNulty, 2013). We also considered that the dominant arrangement of pension fund 
investment management is delegation through investment experts (Clark, 2000; Tilba 
and McNulty, 2013). However, given the examples of collective engagement of 
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smaller local authority funds through the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum 
(LAPFF), we allowed that medium and small size pension funds with delegated 
investment management might also be in a position to exert influence. As a result, our 
sample was diverse enough to represent all of these characteristics.   
Data Collection  
Data collection and analysis occurred in two stages. The first stage was 
completed in 2010 and resulted in 35 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The 
interviewees were asked about (i) their role and main responsibilities within the 
organisation; (ii) their reflection on the key issues/drivers within broad pension fund 
context and their particular organisation, particularly relating to shaping pension fund 
investment and their direct responsibilities; (iii) their interest in relation to being 
influencing/engaged owner; and (iv) their perception of ‘good’ and ‘poor’ 
governance. All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed, resulting in 
approximately 42 hours of recordings and 548 pages of transcriptions. Appendix B 
provides the list of respondents.  
These interviews were supplemented with a series of meetings and round-table 
discussions between June 2013 and February 2014 with pension funds, legal, 
investment and policy experts, as part of the Law Commission’s Consultation on 
Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries to which one of the authors contributed 
extensively as a member of the Advisory Board. We had a unique opportunity to 
return to the initial key interview questions and informally ‘validate’ the interviewees’ 
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insights with pension practitioners. The series of meetings took place primarily in 
London and were organized by the UK Law Commission as part of the Consultation.1   
Data Analysis  
We used a grounded theory approach (Glasser and Strauss, 1960) where we 
iteratively aimed to build theory by looking into how meanings and concepts are 
constructed.  Grounded in Mills’ (1940) logic, we aimed to understand ‘vocabularies 
of motives’ of pensions practitioners as situated in time. Although we might not know 
the true motivations of the respondents, we could learn more about interviewees’ 
subjective perceptions of their internal world and detect clues into the way they think 
about how their world works. We take a sociological view here that it is the internal 
subjective reality that can determine how interviewees act in their external world. As 
the intent was to capture the rhetoric around investment, we interviewed respondents 
who were involved in pension fund management and making strategic investment 
decisions.  
 During the first stage of data analysis (completed in 2010), a distinct and novel 
theme emerged: all interviewees referred to a number of factors such as their 
organisational roles and changing context, which they considered to have shaped their 
approach to investment strategy. This prompted a second round of data analysis 
between June 2013 and February 2014. As part of the peer review process, we 
revisited the data again to take a more nuanced view of time. Data analysis was 
inductive and interpretative, using content analysis to analyse the interview 
transcripts. To warrant the robustness of this analysis, we used the techniques similar 
                                                          
1 The Law Commission Consultation (2013) and the Final Report (2014) contain the list of names and 
responses of individuals and organisations that took part in this consultation. 
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to those used by Eisenhardt, (1989), Dacin, et. al. (2010); Creed, et. al. (2010) and 
Tilba and McNulty (2013), which consisted of four steps.  
In the first step of the analysis, interview transcripts were entered in NVivo as 
text files and coded on the basis of ‘in vivo’ words. These comprised descriptions 
offered by interviewees, all revolving around pension fund investment practices and 
examples of engagement and disengagement. Distinct themes relating to 
organisational roles and changing context were identified and also grouped based on 
the engaged or disengaged stance, forming the first-order codes.   
 In the second step, second-order codes were identified. For example, 
comments on the first order code such as ‘organisational roles’ could be distinguished 
into ‘tree nodes’ with statements about fiduciary responsibilities of trustees and their 
expertise. Trustees’ statements about contextual factors were grouped into nodes such 
as ‘economic recession and unstable financial markets’, ‘increased employer 
involvement’, ‘increased human longevity’ and ‘progressing pension fund maturity’.  
The second-order codes were then refined through triangulation of interviews, with 
the notes taken during round-table discussions during the consultation (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985). This was a recursive rather than a linear process, with analysis moving 
iteratively between the first- and second-order codes, and patterns in the data 
emerging into conceptual themes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dacin, et. al., 2010). This data 
was then revisited with a more nuanced view of time. For example, the node 
‘changing context’ was further grouped into two distinct temporal perspectives 
associated with ‘engaged’ and ‘disengaged’ examples.    
In the third step, the emerging conceptual themes were organized into the 
overarching themes that inform our main findings and theoretical reflections. To 
ensure the credibility of our analysis (Shah and Corley, 2006), throughout the process 
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the authors discussed coding, cross-referencing and emerging themes. NVivo also 
allowed the interview content to be analysed more systematically. This data analysis 
enabled us to develop two broad vocabularies of motives that pension fund trustees 
and managers use to explain their own investment practice, alongside temporal 
perspectives. We term these as ‘engaged’ and ‘disengaged’ vocabularies and map 
them as examples A and B illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Research Findings  
 
Empirically, we reveal the existence of different accounts and vocabularies of motive 
within pension fund investment practices. These vocabularies of motive are durable 
and also accompanied with distinctly different temporal perspectives2 (as indicated by 
group A and B along a time continuum in Figure 1). Within disengaged vocabulary 
(group A), trustees and pension fund executives referred to a number of internal and 
external justifications to account for the disengaged and investment performance 
                                                          
2 As significant number of respondents have been working in pensions industry on the average between 
15-20 years, it was possible to get their longitudinal insights on the research topic. 
Past  Present   Future  
A 
B 
Figure 1 Vocabularies of Motive and Temporal Perspectives 
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oriented behaviour. The internal accounts are associated with trustees’ interpretations 
of their fiduciary duties; the levels of expertise on the trustee board and employer 
relationship. External accounts included: unstable financial markets, increasing 
human longevity and progressing pension fund maturity – all considered being 
significant constraints to engagement. In contrast, interviewees who used engaged 
vocabulary (group B) used more positive accounts of their investment behaviour. 
There were also references to internal accounts such as trustee fiduciary duty, internal 
resources and expertise. However, these were considered as enablers of engagement, 
alongside external public pressure for more accountability and engagement. 
We also found that distinct temporal perspectives accompanies engaged and 
disengaged vocabularies. Group A created a distinct narrative of stable funding and 
pension fund’s environment being ‘simple’ and ‘uncomplicated’ in the past, but 
becoming ‘volatile’ and ‘overly complex’ in the present, leading to an ‘uncertain’ 
future. In contrast, group B used a more positive narrative, describing gradual pension 
industry changes from non-engagement in the past to more active engagement by 
some pension funds in the present, and ultimately connecting this to a more 
sustainable future. We elaborate on these findings in more detail next, starting with 
interviewees accounts in the Disengaged Vocabulary.  
Group A Disengaged Vocabulary  
Internal Accounts 
Trustees Fiduciary Duty. All interviewees referred to ‘Fiduciary Duties’3 as the most 
important aspect shaping trustee approaches to investment. We find that the majority 
                                                          
3 The Trustee Act 2000 specifies that trustees have a fiduciary duty of care, which means that in 
determining investment strategy, trustees must consider the suitability of different asset classes in 
meeting the scheme’s liabilities, account for the risks and returns associated with different investment 
products and ensure appropriate diversification of the scheme’s investment portfolio (The Pensions 
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of trustees interpret their fiduciary duty as the duty to act in the best financial interest 
of beneficiaries. Out of 35 interviews, 28 local authority and occupational pension 
fund respondents highlighted that ‘one single objective is to manage the money in the 
best possible way’, and that means making a return on invested capital. Trustees’ 
perception of their duty to act in the best financial interest of the pension fund 
members meant that in-house investment officers were more focused on generating 
investment performance at the expense of anything else. While reflecting on their 
roles, trustees and pension fund managers perceived that pension funds are there ‘to 
provide financial security to members’. Thus, trustees saw it as their duty in relation 
to the trust to fulfil what the law required and ensure that pension fund assets are 
invested in a profitable way. Spending money on engagement was considered to be an 
‘unjustified’ use of pension fund resources. Trustee accounts (Quotes 1, 2, 3 and 4 in 
Table 2, Appendix C) illustrate how trustees made sense of this issue. When it came 
to pension fund governance and compliance, the CEO of a large occupational pension 
fund (over £22 billion) discussed a variety of factors that shifted focus away from 
corporate engagement towards other ‘more important’ issues such as ‘sound 
standards of administration, sensible standards of investment rather than corporate 
governance’. Engagement was seen as an unjustified use of pension fund resources, 
therefore it was not seen as a prudent way of fulfilling a trustee’s duty to grow a 
pension fund. The fund managers said that they exercised discipline over the 
management of the investee companies by exiting or selling the shares, rather than 
engaging. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Regulator, 2010). According to the Trustee Act 2000, trustees are also given power to invest assets in a 
way that produces an income or return on capital.  
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Expertise within trustee boards. A majority of trustees and pension fund managers 
also referred to a lack of investment expertise on their boards and the subsequent 
outsourcing from an increasingly complex pensions environment as another reason 
why they did not engage with their investee companies. Many explained that although 
trustees are responsible for investment strategy, by law they are not required to be 
investment experts. Instead, they are required to take appropriate investment advice to 
help formulate and implement that strategy. Therefore, respondents also shifted their 
individual responsibility for (dis)engagement by attributing it to an increase in the 
availability of financial intermediation in a form of investment consultants and other 
experts.    
Relationship with the Employer. In conversations about the challenges and barriers 
towards investor engagement, interviewees also described the need to maintain a 
good relationship with the employer as a constraint. Nearly all interviewees of 
occupational pension funds related financial well-being of a pension fund to the 
financial health of their employer. Trustees suggested that it is part of their 
responsibility to maintain a healthy relationship with the employer and expressed the 
view that they did not want to engage on any particular corporate governance issue 
because that might damage the reputation of their employer. Quotes 5, 6 and 7 
exemplify this perception. We find that in handling the questions of engagement 
trustees of large and potentially powerful pension funds seem to make a rational 
choice and deliberately remain distant because it ‘makes more sense’ for them to do 
so. Close ties with the sponsor are said to put pressure on trustees and managers to 
maintain the status quo with the company and ‘not rock the boat’. Accordingly, the 
involvement with investee companies was said to be minimal. 
External Accounts 
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Unstable financial markets. All interviewees perceived that they were operating in an 
environment characterized by unstable and complex financial markets, a situation 
which made it difficult for them to engage with investee corporations because they 
were more preoccupied with generating investment returns from their investment 
portfolios. Respondents expressed views that economic and financial instability have 
further worsened pension schemes’ funding and increased the financial vulnerability 
of pension funds, putting more pressure on schemes to look for other means and 
investment tools to improve funding. Most interviewees referred to the falls in 
productivity, corporate insolvency risks and reduced levels of employer contributions 
as key external drivers shaping their investment strategy. In the context of local 
authority pension funds, there was a common perception that the worsening economic 
climate had put pension funds in a huge financial strain, precluding trustees from 
focusing on stewardship and engagement. Quotes 12 and 13 highlight this common 
perception. 
Increasing human longevity was another factor that interviewees commonly referred 
to when they reflected on their investment practices. Scientific data show that 
increasing life expectancy rose both in men and women: a 65-year-old man retiring 
today will, on average, live to 89 (The Economist, February 23-29, 2008). Over a 
third of interviewees perceived longevity as one of the largest pension risks, after the 
investment risk impacting on their investment strategy. According to most 
respondents, operating in a world where people live longer would meant that pensions 
have to be paid out over longer periods of time, but at similar pension contribution 
levels. According to The Purple Book (2009), an increase in human longevity by two 
years had increased schemes’ liabilities by around £51.4 billion, or 5.2% of liabilities. 
While reflecting on the current conditions, the respondents emphasized that the main 
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challenge of increased longevity relates to maintaining scheme funding and making 
pensions affordable (Quote 10). Crucially, interviewees perceived that increased 
longevity and the associated increase in pension liabilities put pressure on trustees to 
focus more on generating investment returns within their investment fund manager 
mandates, rather than corporate governance matters. 
Pension fund maturity. The more mature a fund is, the less contributions it receives 
from its working members and the more benefits it needs to pay out to the retired 
members. The common understanding amongst practitioners was that the more 
mature pension funds face more pressing liquidity demands and financial needs. Over 
80% of pension funds in the sample were mature or maturing pension funds. 
Subsequently, trustees and pensions managers explained that because they run 
maturing funds, their investment priority was to generate more returns on their 
investments and diversify their investment portfolio to match pension liability profiles 
more closely. (Quote 11). The language of ‘generating investment returns’ in order to 
‘pay out pensions now as opposed to later’ was used throughout all discussions, 
particularly when practitioners accounted for their reasons behind disengagement.   
Temporal Perspective  
In our data, we found that trustees and pension fund managers who broadly used 
disengaged vocabulary shared a similar temporal perspective of the pension fund 
industry being ‘secure’ in the past, but then becoming increasingly ‘complex’ and 
‘pressured’ in the present. Such use of the past seems to have created a narrow vision 
of the uncertain future, where trustees ought to be thinking of ‘the bottom line’.  
From surpluses to deficits. Alongside the interviewees’ references to external socio-
economic ‘reasons’ , they have also contextualised it using a rhetoric of pension fund 
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finances suffering a double blow: one from falls in stock markets and another dealt by 
increasing longevity. This ultimately is said to have transformed the pensions industry 
from being in surplus in the past to being in deficit in the present and putting more 
financial pressure on trustees to be more short-term in future. Quotes 12 and 13 are 
suggestive of this narrative. Interviewees suggest that pension fund deficits have 
contributed significantly to the shrinkage of pension fund investment horizons. 
Ultimately, most trustees and pension fund managers were ‘worried about what is 
going to happen to pensions in the next three months’. As a consequence, they said 
they had to focus more on investment performance of their asset portfolio over the 
short term, rather than long-term engagement with equity investments.  
Increasing trend towards outsourcing. When reflecting on the nature of their job, 
interviewees conjured up a vocabulary of a ‘different world’ when they talked about 
the pension fund industry, particularly the investment arena. A CEO of a pension fund 
with assets under management exceeding £20 billion made sense of his 30 years of 
experience within the pension fund industry in terms of having more problems 
because of the multiplicity of advisers they have to deal with (Quote 14 and 15). 
Pension fund trustees and executives with decades of experience working in the 
pensions industry have all noted that in the past fifteen years there has been a move 
towards outsourcing of investment management to external specialist managers and 
other experts.  
Increasing complexity of financial products and structures. Interviewees’ accounts 
also evoked an impression of increasing complexity and volatility in the pensions 
industry: an increasing range of investment products available, larger number of 
managers to offer and manage these products, and the associated multiplicity of fund 
manager mandates. All of these were said to further detach pension fuds from their 
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investee corporations. Quotes 16, 17 and 18 illustrate these accounts. Many pension 
funds in this group had over 40 investment mandates, sometimes over a hundred. 
Over time, these increases in mandates is said to become too much for the existing 
governance structures of pension funds, which makes it difficult to monitor what the 
fund managers deliver.  
The complexity of investment products is also accompanied with the complexity of 
investment contracts attached to those products and a sophisticated jargon, which 
trustees often did not understand as it ‘wasn’t in the discussions that trustees had 
years ago’. Such complexity of pension fund investment is said to have had huge 
implications for pension fund investment strategy, causing trustees to focus on short-
term investment returns within investment mandates. The focus on investment 
performance and funds’ ‘exit’ strategy is best summarised in Quote 19.  
Increasing complexity in regulation. Interviewees also highlighted an increasing 
burden of regulation over time, which has put more responsibilities on trustees, 
creating ‘a culture of box-ticking’ that was ‘gradually replacing professionalism’.  
According to pensions practitioners, ‘every time there is a crisis, people say that the 
answer is more regulation, more detail and more boxes to tick’; this type of mentality 
meant that trustees found it ‘difficult to see the big picture because they are 
overwhelmed by all the detail’. Quotes 20, 21 and 22 illustrate this perspective.  
Group B Engagement Vocabulary  
In contrast to group A, very few interviewees (represented only by two large 
occupational pension funds and pension funds within the Local Authority Pension 
Fund Forum) used a more positive vocabulary about engagement.  
Internal Accounts 
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Trustees’ Fiduciary Duties. Several respondents within this group ‘made sense’ of 
engagement by relating it to their fiduciary duty. However, unlike the narrative within 
disengaged vocabulary, trustees and pension fund managers interpreted their fiduciary 
duty of loyalty as securing not only the best financial interests of members by 
focusing on investment (out)performance, but also by making sure that investments 
are sustainable over time through engagement. One Trustee explained that 
engagement is actually good business (Quote 23). Interestingly, a CEO of one 
industry-wide pension fund also noted that ‘there are differences in the drivers of 
investment strategy between local authority and private sector pension funds’, where 
public sector funds have a ‘more moral view of things’ running through their 
investments. This view is echoed by five respondents from LAPFF who associated 
their fiduciary duty with being a responsible owner of shares, providing not only 
capital but also being concerned with environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues for the greater good of society (Quotes 24). 
Resources and Expertise. Interviewees also suggested that the size of a fund, its 
internal resources and the level of expertise on the trustee board play a crucial role in 
enabling engagement activities. The more resources and expertise a fund has in-
house, the more control it has over the formulation and implementation of its 
investment strategies. Coupled with the internal ‘ethos’ of stewardship, these 
characteristics were said to have allowed trustees to exercise their fiduciary duty and 
act in the best long-term interests of their members in a more ‘responsible’ way. 
Quote 25 captures this perception. We also note here that smaller and less resourced 
local authority schemes ‘pulled their resources together’ and engaged via LAPFF.  
External Accounts 
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Public Pressure for Accountability and Engagement. Interviewees noted that the 
increasing public pressure for accountability was one of the reasons for such a 
‘concentration’ of responsible investment interests within the public sector pension 
funds. Local authorities were said to have more pressure to have higher standards of 
public accountability and more is expected of these funds in terms of dealing with 
ESG issues. (Quote 26 exemplifies this account.) In short, engagement ‘made sense’ 
and was embedded in the investment philosophy and connected to the overall 
investment decision-making process.  
Temporal Perspective  
In contrast to disengaged vocabulary we find that trustees and pensions executives 
within this group talk about past, present and future in a more positive way. 
Respondents described gradual pension industry changes from non-engagement in the 
past to more active and meaningful engagement by some pension funds in the present 
and ultimately connecting this to a more sustainable future. Interviewees suggested 
that there is more attention not only to pension fund governance within the industry, 
but also more responsibility around investment stewardship, which was a result of 
increased public pressure to take ESG issues more seriously (Quotes 27, 28 and 29). 
Trustees and pensions executives also reflected on the positive changes in the pension 
fund industry, by saying that the Pensions’ Regulator provided a wealth of 
information which allowed trustees to become ‘more professional’ and ‘more 
knowledgeable’ about investment and stewardship.   
Longer investment time horizons. Interestingly, pension funds within group B talked 
more positively about the past, which appears to have increased their tolerance 
towards future uncertainty, allowing them to focus more on investment sustainability, 
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partly through stewardship and engagement. This was evident from longer investment 
performance evaluation cycles. In contrast to group A, where predominantly quarterly 
fund manager performance evaluations prevailed, group B looked three to five years 
ahead. Respondents also recognised a tension between fund managers having to report 
on investment performance on a quarterly, even monthly, basis and a more long-term 
investment horizon than pension funds can have. A CIO of a multi-billion bound 
pension fund articulated this comparison in Quote 30. Local governance pension 
schemes (LGPS) had the longest outlook into the future because they did not have the 
yearly appraisals of pension fund liabilities ‘on the balance sheet of the corporate 
sponsor’.  When setting up the investment strategy, a number of schemes were 
looking as far ahead as fifteen-twenty years.  
Discussion  
The aim of this research was to shed new light on pension fund investment 
strategies and the approaches to equity ownership. More specifically, how pension 
fund practitioners talk about engagement and disengagement vis-à-vis investee 
corporations over time. We used theorizations about time (Bluedorn and Standfier, 
2006; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012) and the notions of vocabularies of motive (Mills, 
1940; Weick, 1969; Whittle and Mueller, 2015), as a novel cross-disciplinary lens to 
shed light on pension fund investment strategies. Methodologically we moved away 
from the hard laws of economic behaviour and the dichotomous principal/agent view 
of investor/company relationship towards more soft and qualitative assumptions 
which take into account the often messy, fluid and complex view of social 
organization. We also viewed pension funds as one distinct type of investor to account 
for investor heterogeneity (Ryan & Schneider, 2003; Koh, 2007; Connelly, et. al. 
2010).  
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Empirically, our findings offer novel qualitative insights into the vocabularies 
and temporal perspectives that trustees and pension fund managers use to account for 
their investment behaviour. We extend the very few and mostly quantitative studies 
on pension funds in relation to corporate governance. Looking at what economic 
sociologists would call ‘the blind spot’, we particularly provide further evidence to 
support ongoing scholarly concerns about pension fund willingness and ability to act 
as engaged owners (Webb, et. al. 2003; Hellman, 2005; Kahan and Rock, 2007; 
Conyon and Sadler, 2010).   
More specifically, while the most recent qualitative study by Tilba and 
McNulty (2013) associate UK pension fund disengagement with the complexity 
within the investment chain and a subsequent disconnect in accountability 
relationships alongside it, we find that this picture is much more complex. By using 
the examples of pension fund engagement and disengagement, we reveal the existence 
of different accounts and vocabularies of motive within pension fund investment 
practices. These vocabularies of motive are durable and also accompanied with 
distinctly different temporal perspectives. We term these as ‘engaged’ and 
‘disengaged’ vocabulary, which included a range of external and internal accounts 
described as enablers of or barriers to engagement. Our findings highlight a tension 
between a seeming relationship between vocabularies and accounts and future pension 
fund behaviour vis-à-vis investee corporations. During the interview discussions and 
often implicitly interviewees linked their accounts with their pension fund investment 
strategies and engagement. For example, when reflecting on their organisational roles, 
trustees and executives who used disengaged vocabulary (Group A) interpreted their 
fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interests of beneficiaries as the duty to act in 
the best financial interests, which they said precluded them from engagement. In 
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contrast, trustees and executives in (Group B), have linked the same notion of 
fiduciary duty to their engagement actions.  Similarly, in giving an account of the 
relationship with the employer, trustees in group A have emphasised their dependency 
on employer contributions, linking this dependency with their unwillingness to 
engage with corporations. In contrast, these accounts were absent from the accounts 
of the interviewees in the engaging pension funds in group B.  
Similarly, trustees  in group A linked external socio-economic factors such as 
unstable financial markets, increasing longevity and progressing pension fund 
maturity with increased pension fund deficits and liabilities – all factors which 
respondents claim to have diminished pension fund capacity to engage with investee 
corporations. Although engaging pension funds’ respondents all mentioned these 
factors, they did not consider them to be a barrier to engagement. Instead, they were 
talking about increasing public pressure on accountability, which has often prompted 
more engagement actions.   
We also find that disengaged and engaged vocabularies or ‘scripts’ are 
contextualized within different temporal perspectives. Pension fund practitioners who 
used a disengaged vocabulary had a more negative perception of the present in 
comparison to the past, which was connected to short-term future uncertainty. 
Trustees and executives were describing a transition from pension’s surpluses into 
deficits, an increasing trend towards outsourcing, and increased complexity of 
financial products and structures, which was detaching trustees too far from investee 
companies. Furthermore, a burden of over-regulation was said to create a culture of 
box-ticking rather than meaningful engagement. 
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In contrast, engaged vocabulary consisted of a narrative of positive gradual 
changes in the industry over time, which was associated to a longer-term and 
sustainable future.  Interestingly, the temporal perspective within disengaged 
vocabulary suggests a discord between the long-term investment horizon of pension 
funds and the need to provide a pension which is sustainable in future on the one hand 
and a short-term and more ‘immediate’ financial pressures in the present. Within such 
a temporal perspective, engagement was also often described as a trend in time.   
Theoretically, our findings support the growing body of qualitative 
governance research, which highlight the need to attend to the practices, meanings 
and motives that underpin investment management by institutions  (Hendry, et. al.’s, 
2004; 2006; 2007, Tilba and McNulty, 2013). Our empirical insights into pension 
fund vocabularies highlight the significance of different narratives and also help 
develop a more coherent understanding of how vocabularies work (Loewenstein, et. 
al, 2012). Furthermore, our analysis of temporal perspectives adds to an embryonic 
stream within corporate governance research which examines a multi-faceted view of 
time in relation to ESG issues like climate change (Slawinski and Bansal, 2012).Our 
findings also support their claim that variability of interpretation of time can shed 
more light on the variance in organizational behaviour.  
Significantly, we suggest that the tension between discourse and action in this 
study may represent not simply the individual motivations of fund managers, but 
rather are expressions of extant norms in the broader social context of financial 
markets. We believe that these contrasting accounts and the associated engagement or 
disengagement actions may be an example of organisational enactment through co-
production of vocabularies of motive, which is consistent with Weick’s (1969) theory. 
The systematic and self-reinforcing processes are something that Aspara, et. al. (2014) 
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and Whittle and Mueller (2015) have been recently investigating in relation to 
investors, the media and the banks.  
Our study provides some initial evidence to suggest that engagement or 
disengagement actions may be a product of accounts, often constructed in unnoticed 
ways through the choice of internal and external, rational or irrational, explanations 
and justifications of behavior.  What is clear from our study is that a great deal rests 
on which accounts of action become embedded in the ‘repertoire of legitimate stories’ 
(Czarniawaska, 1997; 16). In other words, the dominant repertoires/vocabularies can 
provide the dominant patterns of sense-making and reasoning that may inform action, 
creating the very conditions they describe.  
Our findings support the view that ‘vocabulary of motives’ are rooted in the 
culturally and situationally approriate 'scripts' that are available in a particular social 
group in a particular historical period of time. We find that these repertoires of stories 
are embedded within different temporal perspectives, which support the Bluedorn and 
Standfier’s (2006) view of time as socially constructed. Significantly, our findings 
provide some indication that disengaged vocabulary appears to be if not a conduit that 
drives action, but certainly a conduit that can permit disengagement and short-term 
behaviour. Therefore, a fresh research agenda should focus on establishing whether 
this causal relationship exists. This agenda is of particular importance given the UK 
policymakers’ interest in understanding pension fund trustee behavioural dynamics 
(FCA, 2016; Tilba, et. al. 2016).    
Policy Implications  
Both academics and policy makers have focused on shareholder value and the role of 
shareholders, with many attempts made to facilitate further engagement and 
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stewardship between shareholders and management. We find this focus to be 
misconceived, preferring to claim that trustees’ accounts of their fiduciary role within 
the trust relationship contradict in practice the logic of engagement because many 
trustees equate beneficiaries’ interests to financial interests and maximizing 
investment returns. This is also reflected in the contractual relationships with their 
investment fund managers and their mandates, which we argue actually discourages 
the investment fund managers from conducting stewardship activities. An important 
policy implication is that perceived realities of investment are unlikely to cause a 
change in pension fund behaviour because participants’ accounts of their investment 
practice seem to decouple their view of the world from their impact on the world.  
Limitations and Future Research  
Our study has limitations. The qualitative character of this research means that we 
might never move beyond subjective ‘mere rationalizations’ to ‘real motives’ and 
‘uses of time’; multiple others factors may also play a part in self-reinforcing 
behaviors.   We also did not specifically set out to investigate the human perception of 
time. However, we believe that understanding the espoused vocabularies of motives 
and their enactment through time is important because it can be transferred to other 
contexts and organisations. For example, how do investment consultants make sense 
and account for their practices? We argue that these ‘vocabularies’ and ‘time 
perspectives’ in themselves need to be treated as an object of study within 
management and corporate governance research. It would be intersecting to explore 
this in more detail in future, as well as the linguistic behaviour of interviewees using 
Mills’ (1940) theory of language and sociological psychology. In this study we had 
access to what we consider to be ‘key informants’ in the pensions field who have 
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allowed us to theorize about pension fund behaviour vis-à-vis equity investments. 
Future inquiry should test the wider representativeness of these assumptions.  
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Appendix A Data Collection  
Phase 1  
 
Using the sorting tools in the Pension Funds Online database, 2,866 
UK pension funds were identified by their share of UK ownership, 
starting from the minimum value of £1 million + ∞.  
The population range is generated according to fund size in terms of 
capital value, the highest being over £37 billion and the lowest being 
just over £2 million. From this list, Top 100 occupational and local 
authority pension funds were then selected for the second screening 
phase. 
 
Phase  2  The Top 100 pension funds were analyzed and cross-compared, to 
establish the characteristics such as pension fund type, amount of 
assets under management, allocation to equity, mode of investment 
management, and maturity.  
 
After examining these characteristics it became evident that there was 
enough diversity within these funds to reflect the different 
characteristics and the completeness of the range of the responses. 
The sample represents both local authority and occupational pension 
funds, with assets under management ranging from £30 billion to just 
under £1 billion, and total membership ranging from 239,144 to just 
over 10,000.  
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Appendix B  List of Respondents  
 
Position Type of 
Organization 
Assets under 
management 
(£bn) 
Industry sector 
Executive member of 
LAPFF/Trustee 
Local authority fund  
LAPFF 
£3.9 
£95 
Local Government  
Chief Executive Officer  Occupational fund  £7.0 Chemicals and Allied 
Products  
Trustee Local authority fund £3.9 Local Government  
Chief Executive Officer  Occupational fund £22.6 Energy and Utilities 
Chief Executive Officer/ 
Trustee 
Occupational fund  £13.8 Energy and Utilities  
Trustee Occupational fund  £1 Energy and Utilities  
Chief Executive Officer  Occupational  £5.1 Retail and Wholesale Trade 
Treasurer  Local authority fund  £3.9 Local Government  
Corporate Governance 
Counsel  
Occupational fund  £15.9 Tourism and Travel  
Trustee Occupational fund  £1 Energy and Utilities  
Chief Executive Officer Occupational fund £1 Telecommunications 
Trustee/Executive Director  Occupational fund £3.4 Industry-wide 
Manager, Pensions 
Investment  
Corporate N/A Energy and Utilities  
Chief Executive Officer  Occupational fund  £2.4 Media 
Chie Executive Officer  Occupational fund £11.9 Energy and Utilities  
Chief Investment Officer Occupational fund £30.1 Education  
Pensions Policy Manager Occupational fund £30.1 Education  
Chief Executive Officer  Occupational fund £3.4 Industry-wide  
Trustee Local authority fund £4.3 Local Government  
Chairman of Trustees Occupational fund £12.7 Energy and Utilities  
Pensions Secretary Occupational fund  £2.3 Energy and Utilities  
Co-Head of Responsible 
Investment  
Occupational fund  £30.1 Education  
Chief Investment Officer  Local authority fund  £7.9 Local Government  
Chief Executive Officer  Local authority fund  £4.3 Local Government  
Trustee Occupational  N/A Education  
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Pension Fund Manager 
 
Local authority fund  £2.3 Local Government  
Investment Director  Asset management  £12.1 Finance  
Actuary/Retirement 
Consultant  
Investment consulting N/A Investment Consulting  
Chief Investment 
Manager/Former CIO of 
local authority fund  
Asset management  £1.5 Finance  
Investment Manager Asset management  £37 Finance  
Actuary Investment Consulting N/A Investment Consulting  
Client Relationship 
Executive  
Asset management  £300 Finance  
Senior 
Consultant/Chairman/Non-
Executive Director  
Investment Consulting 
NAPF 
BESTrustees 
The Pensions 
Regulator 
N/A  
Fund Manager  Asset Management  £4 Finance  
Partner  Law firm  N/A Legal  
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Appendix C Table 2 Selected Supporting Quotations  
Nr. Role  Quotation  Pension Fund Size/Type 
 
1 
 
Trustee 
‘…The responsibility of each member of the pension fund committee is quite 
clear…they are there to get the best return into the fund. The primary fiduciary 
responsibility is to maximise return – that’s what they are there for’ 
 
Over £3 billion / 
Occupational 
2 Trustee ‘I don’t see that we have any agenda to influence or change the direction of 
policies of any of the companies that we invest in, so it is a paradox, isn’t it? On the 
one hand we declare that we have an active, activism policy because that means that 
we can tick the box as far as reviewing our Myners performance is concerned and on 
the other hand, although we  say have that policy, in terms of where it is taking us, and 
what is going to achieve [emphasis added] for us…. I am struggling to see that we’ve 
got any goals for it to change the behaviour of the target company in any way’ 
Over £1 billion/ 
Occupational  
3 CIO ‘The bottom line is, the most important feature for a pension fund – that is my job – is 
to make as high a return as possible… we are not an ethical fund, so I am not going to 
make a social judgement about what we should and should not be investing in… if I 
find an extremely good commodity manager who doesn’t give a toss about how you 
vote – I would still invest with that manager… I get on with investing in areas that are 
going to give me good return.’ 
Over £8 billion/ 
Local Authority  
4 Chairman of 
Trustees 
‘We are very much passive financial owners- that is how we would see ourselves. It is 
about getting a benchmark return’. 
Over £12 billion/ 
Occupational  
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5 CEO Yes we are a big pension fund, but the sponsor is even bigger, so the security of our 
sponsor, the good will of the sponsor is very important…because the resources are in-
house, it would require the company to be 100% happy with what we are doing, so 
what we are doing would not in any way impinge on [name] reputation …it’s quite a 
deterrent for us…because we don’t want the risk of pension fund requiring of other 
people to do things that we know we can’t do as a company ourselves…I think that 
there is a serious issue here in making progress with corporate governance…We are 
very careful, we have to be clear about what we are not doing and why we are not 
doing it.’ 
Over £13 billion/ 
Occupational 
6 CEO ‘[Corporate reputation] is definitely important and having the good will of the 
company…the money is important …there is an interdependence there, which [the 
pension fund] has to respect’ 
Over £13 billion/ 
Occupational 
7 Pensions Secretary  ‘…it would be very embarrassing to come out and do something completely different 
from the company’ 
Over £2 billion/ 
Occupational 
8 CEO ‘…is that most people have grown up in a world in which you could be reasonably 
confident that the company, which originally founded a pension fund will be around to 
support it through the years...What we are seeing now is…significantly declining 
longevity of corporate sponsors…Most trustees and pension fund members who’d 
grown up in era of relative certainty find it difficult to adjust to the fact that the biggest 
issue that faces trustees isn’t the investments it’s the covenant.’ 
Over £7 billion/ 
Occupational 
9 Chairman of 
Trustees  
‘There has to be a relationship between the trustees and the sponsoring company and 
in the world where everything is in surplus that is not an issue. When there is a deficit 
there is obviously a strain on your valuation…so that provides a certain amount of 
tension between the companies that are not exactly flowing over with money these 
Over £12 billion/ 
Industry-wide 
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days’ 
10 CEO ‘Despite the fact that we now live considerably longer than in 1969, the total level of 
contributions is significantly less than it was in 1969 so we are now trying to produce 
pensions for people who are going to live longer by paying less money – now you don’t 
need to be a genius to see that you are not going to get the same kind of pensions.’ 
 
Over £20 billion/ 
Occupational 
11 Trustee  ‘Although we are a maturing pension fund, because we sit within the sponsor where the 
covenant is exceptionally strong... we can afford to take risks and we expect to be 
rewarded for these risks in the longer- term’ 
Over 13 billion/ 
Occupational   
12 Trustee  ‘During the years that I have been serving as a trustee, this is the first time that the 
group had to cope with managing a deficit. Prior to that, year after year, the trustees 
had the task of dealing with the surplus’.  
Over 10  billion/ 
Industry-wide  
13 Chairman of 
Trustees  
‘Pensions having been for many years a rather boring subject because they were in 
surplus and the only thing you had to do is to turn up for meetings once per quarter, 
make sure that the pensions were being paid. Of course that all turned completely on 
its head as we are now in huge deficits’. 
Over 10  billion/ 
Industry-wide 
14 CEO ‘People who are running pensions investments have got more problems to face…you 
have got a battery of people to advise you on everything - you got investment advisers, 
you’ve got fund managers, you’ve got actuaries, you’ve got performance measurers, 
you’ve got lawyers, accountants, auditors – so whatever is that you need to know as a 
chief executive of a pension scheme, you know there is somebody to tell you’. 
Over £30 billion/ 
Occupational 
15 CEO ‘As the environment in which pensions operate becomes more complicated, then people 
who are running it have got more problems to face and therefore they are likely to 
Over £30 billion/ 
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 need more advice from more, a wider range of experts, so it probably is the case that 
there is more parties. There is certainly, for example, there is wider range of 
investment products, which probably why there are range of fund managers. I mean 
there are more people involved in the process’. 
Occupational 
16 CEO ‘20 years ago there were more in-house managers. I think one thing that has changed 
in the last ten years that a pension fund would typically give its money to one manager 
to manage the whole pot of investments. In the old days the trustees could connect 
much easier with corporations because they had one manager to deal with. Now 
they’ve got sets of consultants, they probably got ten different managers, and each of 
those managers has got a different mandate and a different benchmark in some cases 
and so the trustees are a bit more detached from the corporations’. 
 Over £20 billion/ 
Occupational 
17 CIO ‘If you roll back 15 years people would just have been in balanced fund management 
and they would have had one or two managers and it is challenging because there is 
all these new products coming along all the time that trustees do not really 
understand’. 
Over £3 billion/ 
Occupational 
18 CEO ‘…in the old days the trustees could connect much easier with the company because 
they had one manager to deal with. Now, if it is a big pension fund, the trustees got ten 
different managers and each of these managers has got a different mandate and a 
different benchmark and so the trustees are more detached from the corporations –that 
is particularly so for big pension funds’ 
Investment Fund 
Management House 
19 CEO ‘What we delegate to our fund managers is ‘make us money, provide good returns’ and 
what we select our fund managers on are people who can pick the right stocks…we ask 
them to vote and they vote and that means they can tick the corporate governance box, 
but it is box ticking…And if they don’t like the way the company is being run, they will 
Over £11 billion/ 
Occupational 
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do what we all can do, which is sell it’ 
20 Pensions Lawyer   ‘I think there is a huge burden of over-regulation. There was supposed to be this 
process of simplification in pensions law. The Finance Act 2004, which is probably the 
biggest change since 1972 has done anything but simplified it because there is a whole 
raft of regulation which is very difficult for a lay person to understand - things you 
have to do to fund the scheme and invest in the assets and therefore we are paying a lot 
more, particularly to consultants’.  
 
 Law Firm  
21 Pensions Policy 
Manager  
‘It’s very much like tick-box, because the trustees under the Statement of the Investment 
Principles are required to say what their attitude is in general… but the financial crisis 
has exposed a deeper problem, which is that you can’t do corporate governance 
though tick-boxing, it is very superficial’.  
 
Over £30 billion/ 
Industry- wide  
22 Pensions Policy 
Manager 
‘The Pension’s Act 2004 has created the Pensions Regulator, who has created a whole 
host of regulations about the way schemes should behave, mainly to control risk, trying 
to improve the overall governance of pension schemes, that has come as quite 
significant cost in terms of resources….for many pensions that was a bridge too far’. 
 Over £30 billion/ 
Industry- wide 
23 Trustee  ‘[Engagement] is actually good business…there is evidence that it does add value to 
your shares… as much as 8% to the company value...It probably adds 20%, which is a 
lot’.   
 Over 7 billion/ 
Local Authority 
24 Chairman of 
Trustees  
‘…to me it is part of my socialist principles….that is where I come from, it is for the 
greater good. I think that is why I got involved in politics, I always believed in social 
 Over £3 billion/ 
Local Authority 
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justice.’ 
25 CIO  ‘As an organization we have a good history of trying to do these things [engagement] 
well as a company itself. Indeed, the pensions team sits within our corporate 
governance department which includes the legal team and senior remuneration and so 
on. I think we have got the resources and we have set out to operate at a high standard 
in the engagement area’. 
 £ 4 billion/  
Occupational  
26 CEO ‘…we are heavily in a public domain and everything we do is funded through the 
council tax, we have real high standards of public accountability and we believe that it 
should run through our investments…so we make our managers vote, we make them 
report back to us on how they voted and the number of times they voted…it tends to be 
the appointment of the chief executive, the appointment of various executive directors 
to the board, the remuneration packages, the mergers, the rights issues…’ 
 Over £2 billion/ 
Local Authority 
27 Investment Manager/ 
Former Pension 
Fund Executive  
‘The industry is getting more interested in engagement. If you looked back 10 or 20 
years – most fund managers, most pensions trustees weren’t really that bothered, they 
were just looking at the investment performance. I think there is much more awareness, 
there is more pressure, more responsibility, there is more governance and I think 
pension funds generally understand and take their responsibilities more seriously in 
this area’ 
 Investment management  
28 
 
CEO ‘The whole industry has moved so much in the past ten years. Stewardship is on the 
consultants’ radar screen now, they are beginning to provide tools and ways of people 
to come together, it is coming into fund manager research a bit more, there are things 
like RI metrics where fund managers can get themselves benchmarked against other 
norms - that simply would not exist ten years ago.’ 
 Over £14 billion/ 
Occupational  
29 CIO ‘Over time our view of responsible investment and corporate governance has changed  Over £4 billion/ 
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beyond all recognition. We are now one of the leaders in the field of responsible 
investment and activism on governance. We also tend to lead the way and are regarded 
as a sounding board in terms of the way people approach the debates about 
responsible investments, sustainability and corporate governance’. 
Local Authority  
30 CIO ‘We actually have a five year performance cycle. But there are always pressures on 
people to perform on a yearly basis and most people I’ve seen in the City are on the 
three-monthly basis, so even if I say to our fund manager: ‘don’t worry we won’t judge 
you in less than 5 years’, they would get quite concerned if they had a bad year and 
they need to do something about it and that sometimes creates unnecessary activity but 
activity is no guarantee of out-performance. It is simple for me because I can’t see any 
shorter term than 5 years – it gives me longer time to get things right’.  
 
 Over £30 billion/ 
Industry-wide  
 
